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Abstract  
We present the first evidence showing causal impact of research and 
development (R&D) tax incentives on innovation outcomes. We exploit a change 
in the asset-based size thresholds for eligibility for R&D tax subsidies and 
implement a Regression Discontinuity Design using administrative tax data on 
the population of UK firms. There are statistically and economically significant 
effects of the tax change on both R&D and patenting, with no evidence of a 
decline in the quality of innovation. R&D tax price elasticities are large at about 
2.6, probably because the treated group is from a sub-population subject to 
financial constraints. There does not appear to be pre-policy manipulation of 
assets around the thresholds that could undermine our design, but firms do adjust 
assets to take advantage of the subsidy post-policy. We estimate that over 2006-
11 business R&D would be around 10% lower in the absence of the tax relief 
scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is recognized as the major source of growth in modern economies. But be-
cause of knowledge externalities, private returns on research and development (R&D) are typi-
cally much lower than their social returns, hence the need for some public subsidy.1 As a conse-
quence, every country treats R&D investments more generously than capital investment, but the 
majority of OECD countries (and many developing countries) also have additional fiscal incen-
tives such as enhanced deductions for R&D. Over the last two decades, these tax incentives have 
grown more popular compared to more direct R&D subsidies to firms.2 One reason for this shift 
is that subsidizing R&D through the tax system rather than direct grants reduces administrative 
burden and mitigates the risk of “picking losers” (i.e. choosing firms with low private and social 
returns due to political connections). 
But do R&D tax incentives actually work? The existing literature has several serious 
shortcomings that we seek to address in this paper. First, researchers have mainly focused on the 
effects of taxes on R&D whereas the point of the policy is to try and stimulate innovation.3 The 
tax incentive could increase observed R&D without having much effect on innovation if, for 
example, firms re-labeled existing activities as R&D to take advantage of the tax credits or only 
expanded very low quality R&D projects. We address this issue by analyzing the effect of R&D 
tax incentives not only on R&D expenditures but also on patenting activity (and other outcome 
measures such as firm size). We also look at the quality of these additional innovations through 
various commonly used measures of patent value. 
A second problem with the literature it that it has proven difficult to come up with com-
pelling causal designs to evaluate the impact of R&D tax policies. Evaluations at the macro-
                                                     
1 Typical results find marginal social rates of return to R&D between 30% and 50% compared to private returns 
between from 7% to 15% (Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Endogenous growth theories (Romer 1990, Aghion 
and Howitt 1992) provide several reasons why private innovative activities do not take into account externalities 
over producers and consumers, and produce less than optimal innovations and growth. For evidence showing R&D 
externalities, see for example Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013). There is also evidence that these 
spillovers are partially localized geographically, so the country where the R&D is performed obtains a dispropor-
tionate share of the productivity benefits, at least initially.   
2 Over the period 2001-2011, R&D tax incentives were expanded in 19 out of 27 OECD countries (OECD 2014). 
3 There is a large literature on the effects of public R&D grants on firm and industry outcomes such as Einiö (2014), 
González, Jamandreu and Pazó (2005), Goodridge et al. (2015), Jaffe and Lee (2015), Lach (2002), Moretti, Stein-
wender and Van Reenen (2015) and Takalo, Tanayama, Toivanen (2013). The earlier literature is surveyed in David, 
Hall and Toole (2000).  
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economic (e.g. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen, 2002; Corrado et al., 2015) or state level (Wil-
son, 2009; Moretti and Wilson, 2015) face the problem that changes of policies are likely to be 
coincident with many unobserved factors that may influence R&D. On the other hand, variation 
at the firm level is often limited as the tax rules apply to all firms and the heterogeneity in tax 
prices that does exist are driven by firm choices (e.g. R&D spending, tax exhaustion, etc.).  
To address this identification problem, we exploit a policy reform in the UK which raised 
the size threshold under which firms can access the more generous tax regime for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME). Importantly, the new tax threshold introduced was unique to 
the R&D tax policy so it did not overlap with access to other programs or taxes. Prior to the 
major change in 2008 the threshold was based on the European Commission definition of an 
SME. Given this change in tax thresholds, we can implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
Design (e.g. Lee and Lemieux 2010) looking at differences in R&D and innovation around the 
new SME threshold, which was based on accounting data pre-dating the policy change. To assess 
the validity of our design we confirm covariate balance and the absence of bunching of the run-
ning variable (assets) around the threshold prior to the policy change. And we can show that 
there were no discontinuities in R&D, patents or any other outcomes in the years prior to the 
policy change. 
Third, data limitations have meant that the R&D tax credit literature focuses on large 
firms. Since R&D is concentrated, aggregated data will also be effectively dominated by large 
firms. Accounting regulations in most countries only insist on larger (usually public listed) firms 
reporting R&D, hence there has been a particular focus on US Compustat firms.4 But since at 
least Arrow (1962) it is recognized that financial markets may under-supply credit for R&D and 
these problems are likely to be particularly acute for SMEs.5 Hence, extrapolating from the 
innovation response of large firms to policy changes may be misleading. We use a new merged 
dataset containing the universe of UK firms. This combines confidential HMRC data (the UK 
equivalent of the US IRS) on R&D levels with firm accounts from the population of public and 
private firms as well as patents from 60 patent offices. The data is available before and after the 
                                                     
4 Rao (2014) has used US administrative tax data on the firm population to look at the impact of tax credits on R&D 
and Agrawal, Rosell and Simcoe (2014) look at the tax effect on investment for small private Canadian firms. 
5 Since R&D is mainly people, it is hard to post collateral to borrow against. Furthermore, asking outsiders for 
finance may reveal the innovation and so undermine its value.  
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R&D tax change.  
We find large effects of the R&D Tax Scheme on R&D and patents. As a result of the 
policy, R&D approximately doubled in the treated firms and patenting rose by about 60% (and 
there is no evidence that these innovations were of lower value). We estimate an elasticity of 
R&D with respect to its tax-adjusted user cost of about 2.6 – higher than the values typical in the 
recent literature of between one and two.6 We argue that the higher elasticity is likely to be be-
cause the sub-population “randomized in” by the RD Design is composed of smaller firms than 
have usually been examined and so are more likely to be credit constrained and therefore are also 
more responsive to R&D tax credits. We confirm this intuition by showing the response is par-
ticularly strong for young firms, presumably because they are more subject to credit constraints. 
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that between 2006 and 2011 the UK R&D Tax Relief 
Scheme induces £1.7 of private R&D for every £1 of taxpayer money and that aggregate UK 
R&D would have been about 16% lower in the absence of the policy. Given that we confirm the 
importance of positive R&D spillover effects to the innovation of neighboring firms, the policy 
appears to have succeeded in its intentions. 
In terms of the existing literature, some papers have examined the causal impact of other 
types of innovation policy on R&D and other outcomes. These have used ratings given to grant 
applications as a way of generating exogenous variation around funding thresholds. Jacob and 
Lefgren (2010) and Azoulay et al. (2014) examine the impact of NIH grants. Bronzini and 
Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2014) use an RD Design for R&D subsidies in Italy.7 
Probably closest to our paper is Howell (2015) who uses the ranking of SBIR proposals for 
energy R&D. She finds significant effects of subsidies on future venture capital funding, espe-
cially for small firms.8 Some papers have looked at the impact of R&D tax credits on non-R&D 
outcomes without an RD Design. For example, Bøler, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2015) employ 
a difference-in-differences strategy to investigate how the introduction of R&D tax credit in 
                                                     
6 See surveys by Becker (2015), OECD (2013) or Hall and Van Reenen (2000). 
7 The authors look at the impacts of R&D subsidies on investment and patents in Northern Italy in an RD Design 
(they do not have R&D data). In their setting the running variable is determined on the basis of scoring the project 
applications by a committee of experts. They observe a discontinuity in the score distribution around the eligibility 
cut-off, which they interpret as a sign of programme managers being able to assign higher scores for projects just 
below the cut-off to avoid appeals. 
8 She also finds effects on patents, but not on citations from Phase 1 funding. 
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Norway affects profits, intermediate imports and R&D.9 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of R&D on innovation (e.g. 
Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen, 2010). We find that R&D has a positive causal effect on innova-
tion, with elasticities that are underestimated in conventional OLS approaches. More broadly, we 
provide evidence on the role of tax on a particular kind of investment (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; 
Hassett and Hubbard, 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the institutional setting of the tax re-
lief policy; Section 3 explains the empirical design; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 pre-
sents the main results and Section 6 some extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional setting 
We give more details of the institutional setting and tax policies in Appendix A (Table A1 
details the policy changes over time), but summarize the most important features in this section. 
From the early 1980s the UK business R&D to GDP ratio fell, whereas it rose in most other 
OECD countries. In 2000, an R&D Tax Relief Scheme was introduced for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). It was extended to cover large companies in 2002, even though SMEs con-
tinued to enjoy more generous R&D tax relief. The policy costs the UK government £1.4bn in 
2013 alone (Fowkes, Sousa and Duncan, 2015).  
The tax policy is based on the total amount of R&D, i.e. it is volume-based rather than 
calculated as an increment over past spending like the US R&D tax credit. It works mostly 
through enhanced deduction of R&D from taxable income, thus reducing corporate tax liabilities. 
Only current R&D expenditures, such as labor and materials, qualify for the scheme, but since 
capital only accounts for about 10% of total R&D, this is less important (e.g. Cameron, 1996). At 
the time of its introduction, the scheme allowed SMEs to deduct an additional 50% of qualifying 
R&D expenditure from taxable profits (on top of the 100% that applies to any form of current 
expenditure). If an SME was not making profits, it could surrender enhanced losses in return for 
                                                     
9 See also Czarnitki, Hanel, and Rosa (2011), Cappelen, Raknerud, and Rybalka (2012) and Bérubé and Mohnen 
(2009) who look at the effects of R&D tax credits on patents and/or new products. Branstetter and Sakakibara 
(2002) examine Research Joint Ventures and patents. 
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a payable tax credit10 amounting to 16% of enhanced R&D.11 This design feature was aimed at 
dealing with the well-known problem that smaller companies may not be making enough profits 
to benefit from the enhancement rate. Large companies had a less generous deduction rate of 
25% of their R&D and could not claim the refundable tax credits in the case of losses (Finance 
Act, 2002). The refundable aspect of the scheme is particularly beneficial to firms who are li-
quidity constrained and we will present evidence in line with the idea that the large responses we 
observe are related to the alleviation of financial constraints.  
Aggregate business R&D intensity stabilized after the introduction of this R&D tax poli-
cy and Bond and Guceri (2012) suggest that these are causally connected. Guceri (2015) uses a 
difference-in-differences method across firm size classes to look at the effect of the introduction 
of the program and argues that the policy raised R&D by 20% in the affected firms. Fowkes et al. 
(2015) calculate the firm-specific user cost and instrument this with lagged values, also finding 
positive effects on R&D.  
The policy used the SME definition recommended by the European Commission (EC) 
throughout most of the 2000s. This definition was based on employment, total assets, and sales12 
from the last two accounting years. It also takes into consideration company ownership structure 
and constrains variation in the SME status over time by requiring that in order to change its SME 
status, a company must fall in the new category two consecutive accounting periods (two-year 
rule). If a firm is below the threshold in year t, it must be above the threshold in both years t+1 
and t+2 to lose its SME status in year t+2. Otherwise, it remains an SME in both subsequent 
years as it has been in year t.13  
We focus on the major change to the scheme that commenced from August 2008. The 
SME assets threshold was increased from €43m to €86m, the employment threshold from 249 to 
                                                     
10 Throughout we will use “tax credit” to refer to this refundable element of the scheme as distinct from the “en-
hancement” element. 
11 Or equivalently, 24% (=16% x 150%) of total R&D expenditure. See Finance Act 2000 (Chapter 17, Schedule 
20). 
12 We use the terms “sales”, “turnover” and “revenue” interchangeably in the paper, except when more precise 
definitions are needed. 
13 For further details of the EC criteria see Recommendations 1996/280/EC and 2003/361/EC, summarized in 
Appendix A1.  
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499 and the sales threshold from €50m to €100m.14 As a result of these changes, a substantial 
proportion of companies that were eligible for the large company rate according to the old defini-
tion became eligible for the SME rate. In addition to the change in SME definition, the UK 
government also increased the enhancement rate for both SMEs and large companies in the same 
year. The SME enhancement rate increased from 50% to 75%.15 For large companies, the rate 
changed from 25% to 30%. The policy change implies a reduction in the tax-adjusted user cost of 
R&D from 0.19 to 0.15 for the newly-eligible SMEs whereas the user cost for large companies 
was basically unchanged (see sub-section 5.2 below and Table A11). 
We examine the impact of this jump in tax-adjusted user cost of R&D at the new SME 
thresholds. The advantage of employing this reform instead of the other changes in the SME 
definition is twofold. First, unlike the previous thresholds based on the EU definition, which 
were extensively used in many other support programs targeting SMEs, the thresholds intro-
duced in 2008 were specific to the R&D Tax Relief Scheme. This allows us to recover the effects 
of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme without confounding them with the impact of other SME 
schemes. Second, identifying the impacts around newly introduced thresholds mitigates biases 
arising from tax planning of R&D intensive firms which may cause endogenous bunching of 
firms around the thresholds. We show that firms did respond rationally by starting to bunch 
around the new thresholds in 2009 and afterwards. But we also demonstrate that there was no 
bunching around the threshold in 2007 (or earlier) and covariates were all balanced at the cutoff. 
This is important as although the policy was not completely detailed until July 2008 (and imple-
mented in August 2008), aspects of the policy were understood in 2007 so firms may in principle 
have responded in advance. Information frictions, adjustment costs and policy uncertainty mean 
that this adjustment is likely to be sluggish, especially for the SMEs we study here.16  
We will focus on assets as our key running variable. This is one of the three determinants 
of SME status and, unlike employment and sales, it does not suffer from missing values. We 
discuss this in detail in Section 4 and also consider using employment and sales in sub-section 
                                                     
14 The other criteria laid down in the EC 2003 recommendation (e.g. two-year rule) were maintained in the new 
provision in Finance Act 2007 (Chapter 11). This act did not appoint a date on which new ceilings became effective. 
The date was appointed in the Finance Act 2007, Section 50 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 of July 16th 2008. 
15 In parallel, the SME payable credit rate was reduced to 14% of enhanced R&D expenditure (i.e. 24.5% of R&D 
expenditure) to ensure that R&D tax credit falls below the 25% limit for state aid.  
16 Sluggish adjustment to policy announcements is consistent with many papers in the public finance literature (e.g. 
Kleven and Waseem, 2013). 
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6.4. We use the 2007 value of assets as this will matter for SME tax status in 2009 which de-
pends on the past two accounting years as discussed above. Since the policy only began mid-way 
through 2008, it is inappropriate to use values in 2008 as a running variable. Nevertheless, we 
examine what happens when we consider other years for the running variable in robustness tests. 
3. Empirical strategy 
We start with a simple R&D equation: 
ݎ݀௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙଵ,௧ ൅	ߚிௌ,௧ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൅ ଵ݂,௧൫ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߝଵ௜,௧                                          (1) 
where t = 2009, 2010, 2011 and ߝଵ௜,௧ is an error term.  ݎ݀௜,௧ is R&D the expenditure of firm i in 
year t and ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ ܫሼ	ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൑ ̃ݖ	ሽ is a binary indicator equal to one if assets in 2007 ( ) is 
equal to or less than the corresponding new SME threshold, ̃ݖ. The coefficient of interest ߚிௌ 
estimates the effect of the difference in tax relief schemes between SMEs and large firms on 
firms’ R&D spending. In an RD Design framework, the identification assumption requires that 
the distribution of all predetermined variables is smooth around the threshold, which is testable 
on observables. The identification is guaranteed when firms cannot manipulate their running 
variable, ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ (Lee, 2008). Under this assumption, eligibility, ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻, is as good as randomly 
assigned at the cutoff. We consider year by year regressions of equation (1) as well as averaging 
over three post-policy years. 
Equation (1) can be derived from the static first order condition of a firm with an R&D 
augmented CES production function (see Appendix A). We show how the elasticity of R&D with 
respect to its user cost can be derived in Section 5 below. 
As is standard in RD Designs, we control for separate polynomials of the running varia-
ble on both sides of the assets threshold of €86m.17 As noted above, because of the two-year rule, 
a firm’s SME status in 2009 is partly based on its financials in 2007. These are unlikely to be 
manipulated by firms for tax planning purpose since the start date of the new SME definition 
(August 1st 2008) was only announced on July 16th 2008.18 Using total assets in 2007 as our 
                                                     
17 We also follow Gelman and Imbens’s (2014) warning against using higher order polynomials, especially when 
higher order coefficients are not significant. We show in robustness checks that including higher order polynomials 
produce qualitatively similar results across all specifications. 
18 Finance Act 2007, Section 50 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 of July 16th 2008. 
,2007iz
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primary running variable thus mitigates the concern that there may have been endogenous sort-
ing of firms across the threshold. Nevertheless, since there were discussions of the change in 
thresholds in late 2006 we are careful to check for continuity of observables around the thresh-
olds even in 2007. 
Notice that the “new SMEs”, i.e. those who became SMEs only under the new definition, 
could only obtain the higher tax deduction rates on R&D performed after August 2008. Hence, to 
the extent that firms could predict the change in thresholds in early 2008 (or they could manipu-
late the reported timing of within year R&D), such companies would have an incentive to reduce 
2008 R&D expenditures before August and increase them afterwards. To avoid these complexi-
ties with the transition year of 2008, we focus on 2009 and afterwards as full post-policy years. 
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of firms’ 2007 assets appears continuous around the 
new 2008 SME threshold of €86m. The McCrary test gives a discontinuity estimate (log differ-
ence in density height at the SME threshold) of -0.026 with a standard error of 0.088, which is 
close to and not significantly different from zero. Sub-section 6.3 discusses how there is also 
continuity in earlier years, but how this changes in later years in response to the policy switch. 
In terms of innovative outputs we consider the following patent equation analogous to the 
R&D equation (1): 
݌ܽݐ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙଶ,௧ ൅ 	ߚோி,௧ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൅ ଶ݂,௧൫ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅	ߝଶ௜,௧                                       (2) 
where the dependent variable is the number of patents, ݌ܽݐ௜,௧	. Under the same identification 
assumptions discussed above, ߚோி estimates the causal effect of the policy on patents.   
Finally we consider the “structural” patents equation: 
݌ܽݐ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙଷ,௧ ൅	ߛଷ,௧ݎ݀௜,௧ ൅ ଷ݂,௧൫ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅	ߝଷ௜,௧                                             (3) 
which can interpreted as a “knowledge production function” as introduced by Griliches (1979). 
Equations (1) and (3) correspond to a fuzzy RD model identifying the impact of additional R&D 
spending induced by the difference in tax relief schemes on firms’ innovation output, using 
ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ as the instrument for R&D. With homogenous treatment effects, IV delivers the causal 
effect of R&D on patents under the exclusion restriction that the threshold indicator ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ does 
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not affect innovation outputs through any other channel. With heterogeneous treatment effects, 
IV requires a monotonicity assumption that moving a firm’s size slightly below the threshold 
always increases R&D. In this case,  ߛଷ is the Average Causal Response (Angrist and Imbens 
1995), a generalization of the Local Average Treatment Effect that averages (with weights) over 
firms’ causal responses of innovation outputs to small changes in R&D spending due to the IV.  
4. Data 
4.1 Data sources 
Our data comes from three main sources: (1) HMRC Corporate Tax returns (CT600) and 
its extension, the Research and Development Tax Credits (RDTC) dataset, which provide data on 
the universe of UK firms and importantly includes firm’s R&D expenditures as claimed under 
the R&D Tax Relief Scheme, (2) Bureau Van Dijk’s FAME company dataset which provides data 
on the accounts of the universe of incorporated firms, and (3) PATSTAT which has patent infor-
mation on all patents filed by UK companies in the main 60 patent offices across the world. 
CT600 is a confidential administrative panel dataset provided by HMRC Datalab (the UK 
IRS) which consists of tax assessments made from the returns for all UK companies liable for 
corporation tax. It is made accessible to researchers only since 2011 and ours is among the first 
papers to use this dataset. The dataset covers financial years 2000-01 to 2011-1219, with close to 
16 million firm by year observations, and contains all information provided by firms in their 
annual corporate tax returns. We are specifically interested in CT600’s RDTC Tax Credits da-
taset, which consists of all information related to the R&D Tax Relief Scheme including the 
amount of qualifying R&D expenditure each firm has in a year and the scheme under which it 
makes the claim (SME vs. Large Company Scheme). 
Firms made a total of 53,000 claims between 2006 and 2011 (22,000 claims over 2006-08 
and 31,000 claims over 2009-11), about 80% of which are under the SME Scheme. Total claims 
amounted to £2.5bn in R&D tax relief in total between 2006 and 2008 and £3.3bn between 2009 
                                                     
19 The UK fiscal year runs from April 1st to March 31st so 2001-02 refers to data between April 1st 2001 and March 
31st 2002. In the text we refer to the financial years by their first year, so 2011-2012 is denoted “2011”. 
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and 2011.20  
We only observe R&D when firms seek to claim R&D tax relief and all the firms in the 
sample are eligible for some sort of R&D tax relief (it is just that the generosity differs depend-
ing on size). Ideally, we would also use R&D data from other sources, but UK accounting regu-
lations (like the US regulation of privately listed firms) do not insist on SMEs reporting their 
R&D, so there are many missing values. Statistics provided by internal HMRC analysis indicate 
that qualifying R&D expenditure amounts to 70% of total business R&D (BERD).21 Note that 
the other outcomes (like patents) are observed for all firms, regardless of R&D status.  
CT600 makes it possible to determine the SME status of firms who claim the R&D tax 
relief, but not the SME status of firms who are not claiming (the vast majority of firms). Em-
ployment and total assets are not available because such information is not directly required on 
corporate tax forms. Furthermore, only tax-accounting sales is reported in CT600, while the 
SME definition is based on financial-accounting sales as reported in company accounts.22 Con-
sequently, we turn to a second dataset, FAME, which contains all UK company accounts since 
about the mid-1980s. We match CT600 to FAME by an HMRC-anonymized version of company 
registration number (CRN), which is a unique regulatory identifier in both datasets. We merged 
95% of CT600 firms between 2006 and 2011 with FAME and these firms cover close to 100% of 
R&D performing firms and patenting firms. Unmatched firms are slightly smaller but not statis-
tically different from matched ones across different variables reported in CT600, including sales, 
gross trading profits, and gross and net corporate tax chargeable (see Appendix B4).  
All firms are required to report their total assets in company accounts, but reporting of 
revenues and employment is mandatory only for larger firms. In our 2006 to 2011 FAME sam-
ple, only 5% of firms reported employment and only 15% reported sales. By comparison 97% 
reported assets. Even in our baseline sample of relatively larger firms around the SME asset 
                                                     
20 It is currently not possible to merge CT600 with the BERD firm survey which is used to build the national esti-
mate of R&D. The BERD survey (like US BERDIS) is a stratified random sample with very partial coverage of 
SMEs, however, so there would again be partial coverage. 
21 There are various reasons for this difference, including the fact that BERD includes R&D spending on capital 
investment whereas qualified R&D does not (only current expenses are liable). It is also the case that HMRC defines 
R&D more narrowly for tax purposes that BERD which is based on the Frascati definition. 
22 Tax-accounting sales turnover is calculated using the cash-based method, which focuses on actual cash receipts 
rather than their related sale transactions. Financial-accounting turnover is calculated using the accrual method, 
which records sale revenues when they are earned, regardless of whether cash from sales has been collected.   
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threshold of €86m, employment and sales coverage is still only reported by 55% and 67% of 
firms respectively.  For this reason, we only focus on exploiting the SME asset threshold with 
respect to total assets and use this as the key running variable in our baseline specification. Fi-
nancial variables are reported in sterling while the SME thresholds are set in euros, so we con-
vert assets and sales using exactly the same tax rules used by HMRC for this purpose. In addi-
tion, FAME provides industry, location, capital investment, profits, remuneration, etc., though 
coverage differs across variables.  
We use assets from FAME as our key running variable, but also experiment with using 
sales to determine SME status, despite the greater number of missing values. In principle, using 
both running variables should increase efficiency, but in practice (as we explain in sub-section 
6.4) it buys us less than what we hoped for. There are too many missing values on employment 
to use this as an alternative running variable. Note that these are all efficiency issue. The fact that 
we use only one of the three criteria for determining eligibility does not violate the assumptions 
for RD Design, it just reduces the precision of our estimates (and changes the interpretation of 
the estimate in the heterogeneous treatment model).  
The third dataset we exploit is PATSTAT, a database curated by the European Patent Of-
fice (EPO). PATSTAT is the largest available international patent database and covers close to the 
population of all worldwide patents since the 1980s. It brings together nearly 70 million patent 
documents from over 60 patent offices, including all of the major offices such as the European 
Patent Office, the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent 
Office (JPO). Patents filed with the UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) are also included. 
To assign patents to UK-based companies we use the matching between PATSTAT and FAME 
implemented by Bureau Van Dijk and available from the ORBIS database. The quality of the 
matching is excellent: over our sample period, 94% of patents filed in the UK and 96% of patents 
filed at the EPO have been successfully associated with their owning company. We select all 
patents filed by UK companies between 1980 and 2013.23 Our dataset contains comprehensive 
information from the patent record, including application date, citations, and technology class. 
Importantly, PATSTAT includes information on patent families, which are sets of patents protect-
                                                     
23 To avoid double counting, a patent filed by more than one firm is distributed equally among the firms. For exam-
ple, a patent filed by 2 firms is counted as 0.5 for each of the firms. 
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ing the same invention across several jurisdictions. This allows us to identify all patent applica-
tions filed worldwide by UK-based companies and to avoid double-counting inventions that are 
protected in several countries.24 
In our baseline results, we use the number of patent families – irrespective of where the 
patents are filed – as a measure of the number of inventions for which patent protection has been 
sought. This means that we count the number of patents filed anywhere in the world by firms in 
our sample, whether at the UK, European or US patent office, but we use information on patent 
families to make sure that an invention patented in multiple jurisdictions is only counted once. 
Patents are sorted by application year. Our measures use all patent application to avoid artificial-
ly truncating the sample, as the granting of a patent is a long administrative process (3.3 years on 
average in the UK, see Dechezleprêtre, 2013).  
Numerous studies have demonstrated a strong link between patenting and firm perfor-
mance.25 Nevertheless, patents have their limitations (e.g. Hall et al., 2013). To tackle the prob-
lem that the value of individual patents is highly heterogeneous, we (i) show results separately 
for high value EPO patents vs. UK patents, (ii) use data on patent families and (iii) weight by 
patent citations. It has been demonstrated that the number of countries in which a patent is filed 
and the number of citations received by a patent in subsequent patents are both correlated with 
other indicators of patent value.26 
4.2 Baseline sample descriptive statistics 
We construct our baseline sample from the above three datasets. Our baseline sample 
contains 5,888 firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m which survive27 at least 
until 2008 based on a €25m bandwidth around the threshold, with 3,651 firms under the €86m 
SME asset threshold and 2,327 firms above the threshold. The bandwidth of €25m is somewhat 
                                                     
24 This means that thanks to patent family information our dataset includes patents filed by foreign affiliates of UK 
companies overseas that relate to an invention filed by the UK-based mother company. However, patents filed 
independently by foreign affiliates of UK companies overseas are not included. 
25 For example, see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) on US firms or Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) on 
UK firms. 
26  Lanjouw et al. (1998), Harhoff et al. (2003), Squicciarini et al. (2013), Hall et al. (2005), Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004). 
27 Firms who die are kept in the sample to avoid selection bias, but are given zero R&D. 
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arbitrary, so we show robustness to a range of alternative bandwidths.28 Our key outcome varia-
bles include amount of qualifying R&D expenditure, and number of patents filed. All nominal 
variables are converted to 2007 price using the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI), and all outcome 
variables are winsorized at 2.5% of non-zero values to mitigate the leverage of outliers.29 In 
2006-08 224 of these firms had positive R&D and this number rose to 254 over 2009-11 (rough-
ly 5% of aggregate R&D expenditure). 210 firms filed 327 patents over 2006-08, and 157 firms 
filed 285 patents over 2009-11.      
In the 2006-2008 period firms below the threshold spent on average £57,800 per annum 
on R&D and firms above the threshold spent an average of £94,500 (with an overall average of 
£72,300). After the policy between 2009 and 2011 these numbers changed to £72,000 and 
£93,600. In other words, the gap in R&D spending between the two groups of firms almost 
halved from £36,700 pre-policy to £21,600 post-policy. In terms of innovation outputs, the aver-
age number of patents per annum was similar between the two groups of firms before the policy 
change (0.06), while after the policy change, firms below the SME asset threshold filed 30% 
more patents than those above the threshold (0.06 vs. 0.04). Detailed descriptive statistics by 
year across the two groups are in Table 1. 
These “difference in differences” estimates are consistent with our hypothesis that the 
2008 policy change induces firms below the new SME asset threshold, which are more likely to 
benefit from more generous tax relief under the SME scheme, to increase their R&D and patents. 
Gureci (2015) and Guceri and Li (2015) come to the same conclusion using a difference in dif-
ference approach.30 However, there could be differential time trends correlated with size which 
could confound these simple comparisons between smaller and larger firms. We now turn to 
implementing the RD Design of equations (1)-(3) to investigate the causal effects directly. 
                                                     
28 The Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) optimal bandwidth for using R&D as the outcome variable is 22, which is 
close to our baseline choice of 25. 
29 This is equivalent to “winsorizing” the R&D of the top 5 to 6 R&D spenders and the number of patents of the top 
2 to 4 patenters in the baseline sample each year. We also show robustness to excluding outliers instead of winsoriz-
ing outcome variables. 
30 Unlike our paper they look only at R&D, however, and not patents or other firm performance outcomes. Further-
more, they condition on R&D performing firms which (i) creates selection issues and (ii) means that they cannot 
look at the extensive margin (i.e. they cannot examine whether any firms start or stop performing R&D as a result of 
the tax changes). 
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5. Results 
5.1 Main results 
Table 2 reports R&D regressions (equation (1)). The key explanatory variable is whether 
the firm’s total assets in 2007 was below the new SME asset threshold of €86m. The sample is 
limited to firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m (a €25m bandwidth around 
the threshold), and the running variable is the firms’ total assets in 2007. Looking at each of the 
three “pre-policy” years 2006-2008 in columns (1) to (3), we find that as expected there is no 
significant discontinuity in R&D at the asset threshold before the new SME definition became 
effective toward the end of 2008.31 In the next three columns we observe that from 2009 onward, 
firms just below the SME threshold have significantly more R&D than firms just above the 
threshold. Column (7) averages the three pre-policy years and column (8) the three post policy 
years. The discontinuity implies a causal annual effect of £138,500 per firm, compared to an 
insignificant effect pre-policy. Column (9) presents the difference between columns (8) and (7) 
and even in this specification there is a causal effect of £75,300. Although formally, the absence 
of a pre-policy trend implies that we do not need to take account of the trend, we consider this a 
conservative approach.32 An effect of £75,300 per annum about doubles the average R&D per 
annum observed in the pre-policy period (£72,300), suggesting that the policy had a substantial 
impact from an economic as well as statistical perspective.  
Figure 2 shows visually the discontinuous jumps in R&D at the SME asset threshold of 
€86m. While total assets correlate positively with both outcome variables in the regions just 
above and just below the threshold, as shown by the upward sloping regression lines, right across 
the threshold, there is a sudden jump in R&D expenditure. The size of the jump corresponds to 
the estimate in column (8) of Table 2 and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Table 3 directly checks our RD identification assumption by looking at covariate balance. 
Firms right below and above the threshold are similar to one another in their observable charac-
                                                     
31 The point estimate of 32 in 2008 is a third smaller than in 2007 (although both are insignificant). This could be 
because firms were delaying their R&D in the start of 2008 (before the R&D threshold was changed) to the latter 
part of 2008 or even 2009. The fact that the policy effect in 2010 and 2011 are larger than 2009 makes this some-
what unlikely, but does highlight the difficulty of interpreting the 2008 data (which is another reason for using 2007 
as the running variable). 
32 Alternatively we can condition directly on lagged R&D in the regressions. In Table A3, column (4) shows that we 
obtain treatment effects (standard error) of £82,000 (36,400) when we do this over the 2009-11 period. 
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teristics prior to the policy change. The differences in sales, capital, and employment between the 
two groups of firms in 2006 and 2007 are both small and statistically insignificant in columns (1) 
through (6). After the policy change, we should not observe any discontinuity in R&D around 
any asset threshold other than the true SME asset threshold of €86m. To test this we ran a series 
of placebo tests on “pseudo” thresholds and found no significant effects. In column (7) we use a 
lower threshold of €71m with as an upper bound the true threshold of €86m and as a lower 
bound €46m (€25m below the lower pseudo-threshold as in the baseline). In column (8) we use a 
higher threshold of €101m with as a lower bound the true threshold of €86m and as an upper 
bound €116m (€25m above the higher pseudo-threshold). Neither experiment yield statistically 
significant effects. We also run similar placebo tests using all possible integer “pseudo” thresh-
olds between €71m and €101m with a bandwidth of €25m as in the baseline specification (we 
allow the true threshold of €86m to be included in some samples in this experiment). Figure A1, 
which plots the resulting coefficients and their 95% confidence interval against the correspond-
ing thresholds, shows that the estimated discontinuities in R&D peaks at the true threshold of 
€86m, while they are almost not statistically different from zero anywhere else.   
Our results are robust to a wide range of robustness tests (see Table A3). We follow Gel-
man and Imbens’ (2014) advice in using a first order polynomial for the running variable, espe-
cially as higher order terms are insignificant. If we add a second order polynomial to the baseline 
specification of column (8) in Table 2, the treatment effect (standard error) is larger at 171.2 
(87.4) and the coefficient (standard error) on the first and second order assets terms are 0.1 (0.6) 
and 0.3 (0.7).33 Second, the discontinuity is also robust to adding lagged dependent variable 
controls, industry and/or location fixed effects.34 Third, we obtain statistically significant effects 
of comparable magnitude when using a Poisson specification instead of OLS.35 Fourth, the dis-
continuity remains significant when we narrow the sample bandwidth or when we give more 
                                                     
33 If we add a third order polynomial the treatment effect rises further to 175.3, but is no longer statistically signifi-
cant. The F-test on joint significance of the four higher order terms, however, is 1.05 (corresponding p-value of 
0.38), suggesting they are not needed (they are all individually insignificant as well). 
34 Adding R&D in 2007 or average R&D over 2006-08 as a control variable gives coefficients (standard error) of 
75.5 (37.6) and 82.0 (36.4) respectively, similar to result from the baseline after-before design. Adding industry (4-
digit SIC) fixed effects or location (2-digit postcode) fixed effects gives coefficients (standard errors) of 125.6 (61.2) 
and 107.4 (49.5) respectively. 
35 We do this to allow for a proportionate effect on R&D (as in a semi-log specification). Using Poisson specification 
gives treatment effects (standard errors) of 1.62 (0.57) without lagged dependent variable control and 1.08 (0.54) 
when controlling for R&D in 2007. This is similar to the proportionate effects in Table 2. 
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weights to firms closer to the asset threshold.36 Finally, our estimates are robust to the choice of 
winsorization. 
Table 4 reports the patent regressions (equation (2)) using the same specification and 
sample as Table 2. As with R&D, the first three columns show no significant discontinuity 
around the threshold for patenting activity prior to the policy 2006-08. By contrast, there is a 
significant increase in patenting in the post-policy period from 2009 onward (columns (3) to (6)). 
According to column (8) there is a significant average increase of 0.073 patents per year per firm 
as a result of the policy. The coefficient for the pre-policy period is half the size and statistically 
insignificant (column (7)). If we use the before and after differences, this is still significant at 
0.035, and is a substantial increase over the pre-policy sample mean of 0.060 (i.e. 58% more 
patents). This is a key result, as the R&D policy was not based on patents, so there is no danger 
similar to the case of relabeling existing activities as research. It may be surprising that the patent 
response is so speedy, but patent applications are usually timed quite closely to research expendi-
tures in most sectors (e.g. Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). 
Figure 3 illustrates the discontinuity in the total number of patents filed over 2009-11 at 
the SME asset threshold of €86m, which corresponds to the estimate column (8) of Table 4. As 
with R&D there is clear evidence of the discontinuity in innovation outcomes at directly the 
point of the tax threshold. Furthermore, “pseudo” threshold tests similar to those discussed in 
Table 3 show that the estimated discontinuities in patent counts peak at the real SME threshold of 
€86m and are not statistically different from zero elsewhere (Figure A2). 
We ran all the robustness tests discussed for the R&D equation also on the patent regres-
sions (see Table A4), including adding higher order polynomials of the running variables, lagged 
dependent variables, industry and location controls, using the Poisson specification, widening or 
narrowing the sample bandwidth, giving more weights to firms closer to the SME asset thresh-
                                                     
36 Using bandwidths of €35m or €15m gives coefficients (standard errors) of 43.6 (43.5) and 182.0 (73.5) respective-
ly. Using Epanechnikov-kernel weights or triangular-kernel weights gives coefficients (standard errors) of 148.6 
(57.8) and 151.9 (60.8). 
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old, changing the winsorization parameter, etc. The results were robust.37 
As patents vary widely in quality, one important concern is that the additional patents in-
duced by the policy could be of lower value. Table 5 investigates this possibility by considering 
different ways to control for quality. Column (1) reproduces our baseline results of patent counts. 
Column (2) counts only patents that are filed at the European Patent Office (EPO). It is around 
six times more costly to file a patent at the EPO than just at the UK patent office.38 Consequent-
ly, EPO patents are likely to be of higher value – only about a third of firms who filed UK pa-
tents in our sample also filed at the EPO. It is clear that there is a significant and positive effect 
on these high value patents and on the lower value patents filed in the UK (but not necessarily 
elsewhere) as shown in column (3). Although the point estimate is larger for UK patents than 
EPO patents (0.094 vs. 0.37), so is the mean (see base of the column), so the proportionate in-
crease in patents is by a factor of about 1.2 in both columns (0.037/0.031 and 0.094/0.077).  
As an alternative measure of patent value, we use data on family size, i.e. we count the 
number of jurisdictions in which each invention is patented (see Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 
1998). Since firms have to bear administrative costs for taking out intellectual protection in each 
country, the larger the family size, the more valuable the patent is likely to be (Harhoff et al., 
2003). Compared to citations (see below), an advantage of patent family as a quality indicator is 
that all patent applications of the same invention need to be filed within (at most) 30 months 
after the first filing date. Hence, information on family size is available more quickly than patent 
citations.  Column (4) of Table 5 uses this measure as a dependent variable and again finds a 
significant causal effect, showing almost a doubling of patenting activity.39  
Concerns have been raised, especially in the US, that many patents are of dubious value 
and standards have slackened (e.g. business processing methods like Amazon’s “one click” 
                                                     
37 Adding patents in 2007 or average patents over 2006-08 as a control variable gives coefficients (standard errors) 
of 0.041 (0.021) and 0.043 (0.018) respectively, similar to result from the baseline after-before design. Adding 
industry (4-digit SIC) fixed effects or location (2-digit postcode) fixed effects gives coefficients (standard errors) of 
0.069 (0.035) and 0.075 (0.027) respectively. Using Poisson specification gives treatment effect (standard errors) of 
1.52 (0.50). Using bandwidths of €35m or €15m gives coefficients (standard errors) of 0.045 (0.025) and 0.071 
(0.049) respectively. Using Epanechnikov-kernel weights or triangular-kernel weights gives coefficients (standard 
errors) of 0.071 (0.027) and 0.070 (0.029). 
38 Filing a patent at the European Patent Office costs around €30,000 (Roland Berger, 2005). In contrast, filing a 
patent at the UK IPO costs £3,000 to £5,000 (i.e. €4,000 to €6,000).  
39 We also look at average family size per patent as a measure of patent value (we assign average family size value 
of zero to firms with no patents). The resulting coefficient (standard error) of 0.0038 (0.0314) is also positive, 
although not statistically significant. 
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patent). It is generally agreed though, that patents in chemicals (such as biotechnology or phar-
maceutical patents) remain of high value. Consequently, column (5) looks at chemical patents as 
an outcome and column (6) at non-chemical patents. Both dependent variables show a positive 
and significant effect of the policy with proportionate effects which are, if anything, larger in the 
“high quality” chemical patent sector.40  
Finally, counting citations made by subsequent patents are a popular method of account-
ing for patent value (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Hall et al., 2005). If we weight EPO 
patents by future citations we obtain a coefficient (standard error) of 0.004 (0.002) as shown in 
column (7) of Table 5. In column (8), the UK measures are similar in proportionate terms, but 
insignificant at conventional levels. 41 However, we need to keep in mind that our data is very 
recent. For example, patents applied for in 2011 will have been published in 2012 or 2013 and 
hence will have had very little time to be cited.42 
In summary, there is no strong evidence from Table 5 of any fall in innovation quality as 
a result of the policy. 
Table 6 reports IV patents regressions where the key right hand side variable, R&D, is in-
strumented by the discontinuity in the tax threshold.43 Column (1) presents the OLS version 
which shows a positive association between patents and R&D. Column (2) presents the IV re-
sults which increases the coefficient substantially (although the two estimates are not statistically 
different on the basis of the Hausman test presented at the base of the column). The IV estimate 
implies that one additional patent costs on average £1.9m (= 1/0.53) in additional qualifying 
R&D expenditure. Columns (3) and (4) show OLS and IV results for EPO and the final two for 
UK patents. All have significant effects, though larger for IV than OLS. The corresponding costs 
for one additional UK patent or one additional EPO patent is £1.5m and £3.7m respectively 
(columns (4) and (6)), which reflects that fact that only inventions of higher value typically get 
                                                     
40 If we narrow the outcome still further to only bio-pharmaceutical patents the coefficient (standard error) is even 
larger in proportionate terms: 0.013 (0.006) on a pre-policy mean of 0.005. 
41 The coefficients (standard errors) obtained when we weight UK patents or all patents by future citations are 0.023 
(0.021) and 0.012 (0.012) respectively. We also look at average citations per patent as a measure of patent value 
(again, we assign average citations value of zero to firms with no patents). This gives coefficients (standard errors) 
of 0.0010 (0.0010) for EPO patents and -0.0015 (0.0028) for UK patents. Both estimates are statistically insignifi-
cant.   
42 Patents are published 18 months after the application date. 
43 In the corresponding IV model, the estimate of the first-stage effect of the instrument on R&D is the coefficient on 
the threshold dummy in column (8) of Table 2. 
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patented at the EPO. These figures are broadly in line with the existing estimates for R&D costs 
per patent of $1m to $5m.44 We again subject these IV regression to the robustness tests dis-
cussed for the first stage and reduced form regressions to show that the magnitudes are robust 
(Table A5).  
5.2 Magnitudes and tax-price elasticities 
What is the implied elasticity of R&D with respect to its tax-adjusted user cost? Follow-
ing the existing literature,45 we define the elasticity as the percentage increase in R&D capital 
with respect to the percentage increase in the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital. In our set-
ting, the tax-price elasticity of R&D ߟ is given by: 
ߟ ൌ lnሺݎ݀ௌொ/ݎ݀௅஼ை	ሻlnሺ ߩௌொ/ ߩ௅஼ைሻ  
where ݎ݀ௌொ and ݎ݀௅஼ை are the R&D of a firm under the SME scheme and under the large com-
panies (“LCO”) scheme respectively,46 and ߩௌொ and ݌௅஼ை are the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D 
facing the firm faces under the corresponding schemes.  
Table 2 column (9) generates a treatment effect of £75,300, about a doubling over the 
pre-policy average R&D of £72,300.47 Using these figures for our baseline tax-price elasticity 
calculation gives us a log difference in R&D of lnሺݎ݀ௌொሻ െ lnሺݎ݀௅஼ைሻ ൌ lnሺ75.3 ൅ 72.3ሻ െ
lnሺ72.3ሻ ൌ 0.71.48 We calculate the tax-adjusted user cost, ߩ௙, based on the actual design of the 
R&D Tax Relief Scheme (see Table A1 and Appendix A4 for more details):  
ߩ௙ ൌ ൫1 െ ܣ௙൯൫1 െ ߬௙൯
ሺݎ ൅ ߜሻ 
                                                     
44 Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen (2008); Gurmu and Pérez-Sebastián (2008); Dernis et al. 
(2015). 
45 For example, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) or Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002). 
46 Formally, the numerator of the tax price elasticity should be the R&D capital stock rather than flow expenditure. 
However, in steady state the R&D flow will be equal to R&D stock multiplied by the depreciation rate. Since the 
depreciation rate is the same for large and small firms around the discontinuity, it cancels out (see Appendix A). 
47 As the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D for large companies remains unchanged over 2006-11 (Table A11), it seems 
reasonable to use the average R&D over 2006-08 as a proxy for how much an average firm would spend on R&D if 
it remained a large company over 2009-11. 
48 For robustness checks, we use estimates from various alternative first stage specifications, including both OLS 
and Poisson specifications, and derive estimates for log difference in R&D investment in the range of 0.69 to 1.08 
(see Appendix B). 
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where sub-script f denotes whether the firm is an SME or larger firm, ܣ is the value of R&D tax 
relief, ߬ is the effective corporate tax rate, ݎ is the real interest rate and ߜ	is the depreciation rate. 
As described in Section 2, the R&D Tax Relief Scheme includes a tax deduction feature for firms 
with corporate tax liability with different enhancement rates under the SME and large company 
schemes and a payable tax credit feature for firms with no corporate tax liability only under the 
SME scheme.49 In the case of tax deduction, the value of the tax relief Ad is Ad = τ(1+e) where e 
is the enhancement rate (which is 75% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2009-10 and 
100% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2011). In the case of payable tax credit, the 
value of the tax relief Ac is Ac = c(1+e) where ܿ is the payable tax credit rate (which is 14% for 
SMEs in 2009-11 and 12.5% for SMEs in 2011 and always zero for large companies). Finally, 
the average tax-adjusted user cost of R&D under each scheme is an average of the user costs 
under each case, weighted by the probability, Prሺ. ሻ, that a firm will have no corporate tax liabil-
ity: 
ߩ௙ ൌ Prሺܪܽݏ	ݐܽݔ	݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ ൈ ߩ௦௖௛௘௠௘ௗ௘ௗ௨௖௧௜௢௡ ൅ Prሺܰ݋	ݐܽݔ	݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ ൈ ߩ௦௖௛௘௠௘௖௥௘ௗ௜௧ . 
To calculate this we use the share of firms in the sample with corporate tax liabilities in 
2006 and 2007, which is 45%, as a proxy for Prሺܪܽݏ	ݐܽݔ	݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ. The effective tax rate ߬ is 
28% in 2009-10 and 26% in 2011.50 The average tax-adjusted user cost of R&D is 0.15 under the 
SME scheme and 0.19 under the large company scheme over 2009-11, which translates into a log 
difference in user cost of 0.27. 
Putting all these elements together we obtain a tax-price elasticity of R&D of 2.6 (= 
0.71/0.27). This is somewhat higher than the typical values of between 1 and 2 found in other 
studies.51  However, almost all previous studies have effectively focused on larger firms such as 
publicly listed firms or using state/macro data which will be dominated by the expenditures of 
larger firms (due to the concentration of  R&D ). Our sample, by contrast, is predominantly of 
                                                     
49 In some situations, a firm can first use the tax deduction feature to reduce its chargeable profits to zero, then claim 
the rest of the enhanced qualifying R&D expenditure using the payable tax credit feature. This is called a combina-
tion claim. However, given the very few number of combination claims in our baseline sample, we ignore this case 
for simplicity. 
50 We set the real interest rate ݎ to 5% and depreciation rate ߜ to 15%. As lnሺݎ ൅ ߜሻ cancels out in lnሺ ߩௌொ /ߩ௅஼ைሻ, 
the value of these two last parameters do not affect our final tax-price elasticity estimate. 
51 See the surveys in Becker (2015), OECD (2014), Fowkes, Sousa, and Duncan (2015), Hall and Van Reenen 
(2000). 
21 
 
SMEs around the €86m threshold. As these firms are more likely to be credit constrained (espe-
cially during and after the global financial crisis), they are likely to be more responsive to R&D 
tax incentives. 
Some evidence for the hypothesis that there are larger treatment effects for the more fi-
nancially constrained firms is presented in Table 7. First, we split the sample by firm age, as 
younger firms are much more likely to be credit constrained than older ones. Splitting by median 
age we find that although the effect of the policy is significant in both sub-samples, it is propor-
tionately larger for the young firms. R&D rises by a factor of 2.4 for the young and only 1.9 for 
the old (columns (1) and (2)). Furthermore, when we use the after-before design, the treatment 
effect is significant for young firms, but smaller and insignificant for older firms (columns (3) 
and (4)). Estimates from the after-before design gives a treatment effect to baseline ratio of 2.6 
for young firms and 0.5 for old firms, a difference that is significant at the 10% level (the implied 
tax price elasticities are 4.7 and 1.6 respectively).52 
One concern is that young firms respond more to the R&D tax policy not because they 
are financially constrained, but because they are more likely to have zero corporate tax liabilities 
and therefore benefit more from the SME scheme via payable tax credit. We directly address this 
concern by comparing the responses of young and old firms only among firms with corporate tax 
liabilities for at least one year between 2005 and 2007 (columns (5) to (8) of Table 6). As before, 
we find that young firms still have a much higher treatment effect to baseline ratio in this sub-
sample: 2.4 to 0.5 among old firms, implying tax price elasticities of 4.8 and 1.6 respectively. 
Though these differences are not statistically significant due to smaller sample size, they support 
our hypothesis that the larger treatment effects we find are driven by financially constrained 
firms.53 
5.3 Cost effectiveness of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme 
A full welfare analysis of the R&D policy is complex as one needs to take into account 
general equilibrium effects through spillovers (see below) and possibly aggregate effects on 
                                                     
52 The log difference in the user cost of R&D among younger firms is 0.274, as the probability of payable tax credits 
is 67%. The log difference in the user cost among older firms is 0.267, as the probability of the payable tax credits is 
44%.  
53 Replicating the exercise using the sub-sample of firms with no corporate tax liabilities 2005-07 gives a treatment 
effect (relative to baseline R&D) ratios of 2.8 for young firms and 0.5 for older firms, implying tax price elasticities 
of 4.7 and 1.5 respectively.  
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scientists’ wages (Goolsbee, 1998). We take one step in this direction by implementing a simple 
“value for money” calculation based on how much additional R&D is generated per pound ster-
ling of taxpayer money (“Exchequer Costs”). The details of the calculations are in Appendix A5, 
but we summarize them here. 
As described in the previous sub-section, we obtain empirical estimates of the tax-price 
elasticity from the 2008 policy change. In addition, for every year we can also calculate the 
difference in the user costs of R&D generated by the policy parameters of the tax system. We do 
this separately for each of the three R&D schemes: SME deductible, SME payable tax credit and 
large company scheme. This allows us to calculate the value for money ratio, ∆ೃವ∆ಶ಴ separately for 
each scheme in each year. From the HMRC data (HMRC 2015) we also know the amount given 
out in each of the three schemes by the government (ΔEC). Combining this with the value for 
money ratio (derived from the tax elasticity and the user costs) enables us to calculate the coun-
terfactual level of aggregate R&D. 
The estimated R&D tax-price elasticity of 2.6 implies that a firm entering the SME 
scheme as a result of the new threshold increases its R&D by 84% of its pre-policy level in the 
tax deduction case, and 109% of its pre-policy R&D in the payable tax credit case. The corre-
sponding increase in Exchequer costs by the same firm is 31% of its pre-policy R&D in the tax 
deduction case, and 51% of its pre-policy R&D in the payable tax credit case. In both cases, 
roughly half of this increase is to cover more generous tax relief applied to the firm’s old level of 
R&D, while the other half covers tax relief applied to the firm’s additional R&D. The implied 
“value for the money” ratio of the 2008 policy change, as measured by additional R&D over 
additional Exchequer costs, thus ranges from 2.1 in the payable tax credit case to 2.7 in the tax 
deduction case.  
If we generalize the estimated R&D tax-price elasticity of 2.6 to the whole population of 
SMEs, we can do a similar calculation for the overall SME scheme between 2006 and 2011. 
Value for money ratios are on average 2.79 for the deduction scheme and 2.13 for the tax credit 
scheme. Combining these ratios with Exchequer costs statistics gives us estimates of the addi-
tional SME R&D induced which averages at £719m per year (£321m from the deductible and 
£398m from payable tax credit). Total SME qualified R&D averaged £1,745m, so this is a sub-
stantial fraction. SME R&D would have been 41% lower in the absence of the UK R&D tax 
credit system.  
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We also repeat the exercise for the population of large companies, but with more con-
servative R&D tax-price elasticity of 1.054 as these firms are likely less responsive to tax incen-
tives, and obtain value for the money ratios of around 1.4. These translate into an average of 
£919m additional R&D (about 11% of total large firm’s qualified R&D spending).  
Putting these figures together suggests that the R&D Tax Relief Scheme induced an aver-
age of £1.64bn per year 2006-11, while costing the Exchequer £0.96bn in lost tax revenue – a 
value for money ratio of 1.7. The UK’s qualifying R&D spending would have been about 16% 
lower in the absence of this fiscal support. This suggests that the tax policy was important in the 
macro-economic performance of UK R&D. In Figure 4 we show estimates of the counterfactual 
business R&D (BERD) to GDP ratio estimated in the absence of the tax relief scheme (see Ap-
pendix A.5 for details). It is striking that since the early 1980s UK BERD became an increasingly 
small share of GDP, whereas it generally rose in other major economies. According to our esti-
mates this decline would have continued were it not for the introduction and extension of a more 
generous fiscal regime in the 2000s.55 Business R&D would have been 10% lower over the 
2006-2011 period (total BERD is larger than tax qualifying R&D). 
A full welfare analysis would likely produce even larger benefit to cost ratios than 1.7. 
First, since the taxpayer costs are transfers, only the deadweight cost of tax should be considered 
(e.g. Gruber, 2011, uses 40%). Second, the additional R&D is likely to have technological spillo-
vers to other firms, raising their innovation rates (e.g. Bloom et al. 2013). We examine these 
spillover effects in sub-section 6.5. 
6. Extensions and Robustness 
6.1 Intensive versus extensive margins  
The additional amount of R&D induced by the policy could come from firms which 
would not have done any R&D without the scheme (i.e. the extensive margin) or from firms 
which would have done R&D, although in smaller amounts (i.e. the intensive margin). It turns 
                                                     
54 This follows the conclusions from literature surveys (e.g. Becker, 2014). These elasticity assumptions are likely to 
underestimate the benefits of the policy as (i) the literature may have under-estimated the elasticity due to weaker 
identification approached and (ii) since we find larger elasticities for medium sized firms, the responsiveness may be 
even larger for the much smaller firms who are well below the asset thresholds we consider. 
55 The trend annual decline in business R&D intensity was 1.9% between 1981 and 1999. We estimate that in the 
absence of the policy change the decline would have continued at 1.7% a year 1999 to 2012. 
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out that the main R&D effects are coming from the intensive margin (Table A6). Estimating the 
R&D equation where the outcome is a dummy for whether the firm performs R&D produces 
insignificant effects. By contrast, when the outcome is whether a firm patents there remains a 
positive and significant effect.56 Similarly, if we split by industry, the strongest effects of the 
policy come from those sectors that are more intensive in R&D and patents (Table A8).57  
We also split the baseline sample into firms which made some capital investment in the 
2005-07 pre-policy period, and firms that did not (Table A9).58 The policy effect on R&D and 
innovation is larger among firms who had invested, suggesting that current R&D and capital 
investments are more likely to be complements than substitutes. This result is consistent with the 
idea that firms having previously made R&D capital investments have lower adjustment costs 
and therefore respond more to R&D tax incentives (Agrawal, Rosell, and Simcoe 2014).  
6.2 R&D tax effects on other aspects of firm performance 
We also examined several other measures of firm performance such as size and produc-
tivity using the baseline specification. These results are to be taken with caution. First, there are 
many missing values on accounting values of employment and sales as UK accounting regula-
tions do not insist on these being reported for smaller and medium sized enterprises (as in the 
US). Second, our available panel ends in 2011 and so we will not capture all the long-run effects. 
Table 8 shows that there does appear to be some positive effect on sales (Panel A) and employ-
ment (Panel C),59 but not on capital (Panel B), although the standard errors are large. There is a 
slight tendency for the policy impact on sales and employment to become stronger over time 
(e.g. the coefficients are insignificant in 2009, but larger and significant in 2010). The estimates 
                                                     
56 Table A7 shows similar findings by splitting the sample by firms with and without R&D or patents in the past. 
Both R&D and patent effects come mainly through the intensive margin, driven by firms with past R&D or patents.  
57 These are shown by splitting at median of industry patent intensity, and we generate the same qualitative pattern if 
we repeat the exercise using R&D intensity. Examples of high-patenting industries include electric domestic appli-
ances, basic pharmaceutical products, medical and surgical equipment, organic and inorganic basic chemicals, 
optical and photographic equipment, etc. 
58 Due to limited coverage of investments in FAME, we use data on machinery and plant expenditure reported in 
CT600 as a proxy for capital investments. 
59 If we subtract imputed R&D staff count from employment to net out the impact of the policy on raising R&D, the 
effects are smaller but qualitatively similar. The effects in log term (standard errors) on adjusted employment in 
2010 and 2011 on adjusted employment are 0.24 (0.15), and 0.27 (0.15) respectively. 
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of the policy effect on total factor productivity (TFP, Panel D)60 are very imprecise but there is a 
significant effect in the final column. We should not read too much into this given the smaller 
sample sizes, but there is a hint of the policy effect starting with R&D which shifts patents then 
finally affects productivity.  
6.3 How firms cluster around the threshold in later years 
 As discussed in Section 3, we chose total assets in 2007 as our primary running variable 
to avoid potential endogenous sorting of firms across the threshold once the policy effective date 
was announced in 2008. We test the validity of our primary running variable choice and our 
concern by performing the McCrary test for each year from 2006 to 2011,61 which estimates the 
discontinuity in firms’ total asset distribution at the SME threshold of €86m. The respective 
McCrary tests for 2006 and 2007 (Figure A3) confirm that firms did not manipulate their total 
assets to benefit from the SME scheme before 2008.62 On the other hand, there is some graphical 
evidence of firms’ bunching right below the €86m from 2009 onward, which is most obvious in 
2009 and 2011. Finally, Figure A4 pools together the two years before the policy change (2006-
07) and Figure A5 the three years after the change (2009-11). Again, it is apparent from these 
graphs that endogenous sorting does seem to happen, but only from 2009 onward after the policy 
became effective.  
6.4 Exploiting other elements of the SME definition 
We also explored using other elements of SME definition (sales and employment) to es-
timate the impacts of the policy and R&D and innovation outputs (Table A10). We must interpret 
this with caution because, as noted above, there are many missing values on sales and employ-
ment. Furthermore, we also find evidence that the asset criterion is more binding than the sales 
criterion. As a firm is considered an SME if it meets either the asset or the sales criterion, the 
                                                     
60 TFP is calculated as lnሺݏ݈ܽ݁ݏሻ െ	ሺ1െ∝௟ሻlnሺܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽሻ െ	∝௟ lnሺ݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐሻ	, where ∝௟ is the share of labor 
costs in total revenue at the two-digit industry level across all firms in the FAME dataset averaged across the 2006-
11 period. Material share is not included due to very limited reporting of material costs in FAME. 
61 We exclude 2008 as the increase in deduction rate for large companies became effective before the effective date 
for the changes in the SME scheme (including increase in deduction rate for SMEs and SME definition change) was 
announced much later in the year. As such, it is hard to predict which way the bunching would happen in this year, 
or if it would happen at all. 
62 This is the log difference in density height at the SME threshold. The coefficient (standard error) is 0.029 (0.065) 
in 2006 and -0.026 (0.088) in 2007. 
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asset criterion is binding only when the firm already fails the sales one and vice versa. The bind-
ing/non-binding ratio for the asset criterion is 0.36, considerably higher than the binding/non-
binding ratio of 0.20 for sales criterion (Figure A6).63  
As expected, while we still find positive effects on R&D and innovation outputs using the 
sales or employment criterion (Table A10) but these effects are not always statistically signifi-
cant. They are also of smaller magnitude compared to our baseline effects estimated using the 
asset criterion when taking into consideration the baseline R&D and patent count of the respec-
tive sample. The treatment effect to baseline ratios for R&D using asset, sales, and employment 
criteria are 1.92, 1.27, and 0.39 respectively, and the same set of ratios for patent count are 1.22, 
0.42, and 0.85.64 We also examined whether combining the different SME criteria could increase 
the efficiency of our estimates, but found no significant improvement.65  
6.5 R&D technology spillovers  
The main economic rationale usually given for more generous tax treatment of R&D is 
that there are technological externalities, so the social return to R&D exceeds the private return. 
Our study design allows us to estimate the causal impact of R&D spillovers on innovation by 
other firms. Following the work of Jaffe (1986) we calculate the knowledge spillover pool avail-
able to firm i as SpilltechRDi,09-11 = ,09 11ij j
j i
rd 

  where rdj,09-11 is the average R&D of firm j 
over 2009-11 and ωij is measure of technological “proximity” between firms i and j as indicated 
by which technology classes a firm patents in (e.g. if two firms have identical distributions of 
                                                     
63 Binding/non-binding ratio for the asset criterion is calculated as number of firms with sales in 2007 between 
€100m and €180m/number of firms with sales in 2007 between €20m and €100m, conditioned on firms’ total assets 
in 2007 being between €36m and €136m (i.e. +/-€50m window around the asset threshold of €86m). Binding/non-
binding ratio for the sales criterion is calculated as the number of firms with total assets in 2008 between €6m and 
€86m/number of firms with total assets in 2007 between €86m and €166m, conditioned on firms’ sales in 2007 
being between €50m and €150m (i.e. +/-€50m window around the sales threshold of €100m). The qualitative result 
that the asset criterion is more binding than the sales criterion does not change when we pick different windows to 
calculate the binding/non-binding ratios. 
64 Even when we restrict the sample to firms for which the sales criterion binds when using the sales running varia-
ble, the percentage effects are still lower than our baseline results, and are not statistically significant. 
65 The asset threshold almost always generates large and statistically significant effects on both R&D and patents, 
while the sales threshold does not (columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) in Panel B of Table A10). Joint F-statistics for below-
asset-threshold dummy and below-sales-threshold dummy indicate that their effects on both R&D and innovation 
outputs are jointly significant in all cases. Finally, the estimated effects of R&D on innovation outputs using both 
criteria as instrumental variables for R&D are of similar magnitude to our baseline effect of 0.530 (0.698 and 0.410 
in columns (3) and (6) respectively). However, these estimates are less precise due to the inclusion of an additional 
weak below-sales-threshold dummy instrument. 
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patent classes then proximity is 1 and if they are in entirely different patent classes the proximity 
is zero).66 We follow our earlier approach of using Ej, 2007 as instrument for rdj,09-11 where Ej,2007 is 
the below-asset-threshold dummy in 2007 for firm j.67 Consequently, we construct 
SpilltechSMEi,09-11 = ,2007ij j
j i
E

  as instrument for SpilltechRDi,09-11.	 The exclusion restriction 
requires that the discontinuity induced random fluctuations in firm j’s eligibility would only 
affect connected firm i’s R&D and innovation outputs through R&D spillovers.  
Our main spillover IV regression estimates the impact of SpilltechRDi,09-11 on firm i’s in-
novation, pati,09-11 controlling for firm i’s own R&D, rdj,09-11: 
݌ܽݐ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ ൌ 	ߙସ ൅ ߜݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ ൅ ߠݎ݀௜,଴ଽିଵଵ ൅ ܩ൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ସ݂൫ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅	ߝସ௜   (4) 
where ܩ൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൌ 	∑ ߱௜௝݃ሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ௝ஷ௜ 	and ସ݂ሺݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ and ݃ሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ are polynomials of total 
assets in 2007.68 We instrument ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ	 with ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ and we instrument 
own R&D, ݎ݀௜,଴ଽିଵଵ, with ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ exactly as we did earlier in the paper. 
 We estimate equation (4) on the sample of firms with total assets in 2007 between €46m 
and €126m (as in Figure 1). This is a larger sample than in the baseline sample as the policy-
                                                     
66 Following Jaffe (1986) we define proximity as the uncentered angular correlation between the vectors of the 
proportion of patents taken out in each technology class ߱௜௝ ൌ ி೔ிೕ
ᇲ
൫ி೔ி೔ᇲ൯
భ
మቀிೕிೕᇲቁ
భ
మ
. ܨ௜ ൌ ሺܨ௜ଵ, … , ܨ௜஌ሻ is a 1 ൈ Υ vector 
where ܨ௜ఛ ൌ ௡೔ഓ௡೔  is firm ݅’s number of patents in technology field ߬ as a share of firm ݅’s total number of patents. To 
calculate ܨ௜ఛ, we use information on all patents filed between 1900 and 2011 (80% of these patents are filed after 
1980) and their 3-digit International Patent Classification (IPC), which classifies patents into 123 different technolo-
gy fields. These data are available from PATSTAT.  Bloom et al. (2013) show that the Jaffe measure delivers similar 
results to more sophisticated measures of proximity. 
67 More generally, ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ ܫሼ	ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൑ ̃ݖ	ሽ is a binary indicator equal to one if the 2007 financial variable ݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ is 
equal to or less than the corresponding new SME threshold for it,	̃ݖ. 
68 An RD Design model for firm	݆’s R&D yields ݎ ௝݀,଴ଽିଵଵ ൌ ߙ ൅	ߚிௌܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൅ ݃൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߝ௝ . Aggregating this 
equation across all connected firm ݆’s around the SME asset threshold, using ߱௜௝ as weights, yields 
∑ ߱௜௝ݎ ௝݀,଴ଽିଵଵ௝ஷ௜ ൌ ߙ∑ ߱௜௝ ൅ ߚ௝ஷ௜ ிௌ ∑ ߱௜௝ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻௝ஷ௜ ൅ ∑ ߱௜௝݃൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯௝ஷ௜ ൅ ∑ ߱௜௝ߝ௝௝ஷ௜ . Rewriting the latter equa-
tion then yields ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ ൌ ߙ∑ ߱௜௝௝ஷ௜ ൅ ߚிௌݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൅ ܩ൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߟ௜, which shows that 
ܩሺݖ௝.ଶ଴଴଻ሻ is the appropriate “RD-style” polynomial control when using ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ as instrument for 
ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,ଶ଴଴଻.  
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induced R&D can have spillovers on firms well beyond the policy threshold.69  
Column (1) of Table 9 reports the first stage for the R&D spillover term and column (2) 
the first stage for own R&D. As expected the instrument ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻	significantly pre-
dicts ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ, in the first column and the instrument ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ significantly predicts 
firm ݅’s R&D expenditure in the second column. More interestingly, we see that in the reduced 
form patent model of column (3) the R&D spillover term ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ has a large and 
significant positive effect on firm ݅’s patents. The spillover term is in fact statistically stronger 
than the own R&D effect, due to collinearity issues. If we drop the spillover measure from col-
umn (3) for example, the coefficient on ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻	becomes significant on own patents as in our 
baseline regressions. 
Turning to the IV results column (4) shows that there appears to be no significant effect 
of other firms’ R&D on own R&D. By contrast, the last two columns show that R&D by a firm’s 
technological neighbors (ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ) does have a causal impact on patenting consistent 
with the patent reduced form of column (4). In addition to the instrumented spillover term, col-
umn (5) includes the instrument for own R&D and in column (6) we instrument own R&D by 
the usual own asset threshold. The magnitude of the spillover coefficient is similar in both speci-
fications. In column (6) a £1m increase in R&D by a firm with an identical technological profile 
will increase patenting by 0.009, which is 3.3% of an equivalent R&D increase by the firm itself 
(=0.009/0.273).  
These findings are broadly consistent with Bloom et al.’s (2013) theoretical predictions 
that R&D technology spillovers should positively affect innovations, but have an ambiguous 
effect on own R&D. Finally, estimates from our baseline spillover regression (column (6)) again 
suggest the presence of positive R&D spillovers on innovations.  
There may be some negative R&D spillovers through business stealing effects among 
firms in similar product markets. To address this concern, we follow Bloom et al. (2013) and 
construct ݏ݌݈݈݅ݏܴ݅ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ ൌ ∑ ߶௜௝ݎ ௝݀,଴ଽିଵଵ௝ஷ௜  that captures the R&D spillovers in product 
                                                     
69 Note that ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ is calculated using the population of all possible firm ݆’s, while ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ 
and ܩሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ are calculated using all firm ݆’s with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m (our baseline RD 
sample), as  the RD Design works best in samples of firms around the relevant threshold. Also, in all reported 
results, we use third order polynomial controls separately on each side of the threshold for ݃ሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ and ସ݂ሺݖ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ. 
In this larger sample we found that higher order terms were significant (unlike in the earlier Tables on smaller 
samples). However, using different orders of polynomial controls does not change our qualitative findings. 
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market space, where ߶௜௝ is a measure of product market distance between firms ݅ and ݆.70 Similar 
to the above, we also construct ݏ݌݈݈݅ݏ݅ܿܵܯܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ ∑ ߶௜௝ܧ௜,ଶ଴଴଻௝ஷ௜  as instrument for 
ݏ݌݈݈݅ݏܴ݅ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ. We found some evidence for strategic complementarity in R&D, but there 
were no significant effects of ݏ݌݈݈݅ݏܴ݅ܿܦ௜,଴ଽିଵଵ on patents. 
Together, these findings provide evidence that policy-induced R&D have sizable positive 
impacts on not only R&D performing firms but also other firms operating in similar technology 
areas, as measured by innovation outputs, which further supports the use of R&D subsidies in the 
UK context.  
7. Conclusion  
Fiscal incentives for R&D have become an increasingly popular policy of supporting in-
novation across the world. But little is known about whether these costly tax breaks causally 
raise innovation. We address this issue by exploiting a change in the UK R&D tax regime in 
2008 which raised the size threshold determining whether a firm was eligible for the more gen-
erous “SME” tax regime. This enables us to implement a Regression Discontinuity Design and 
assess impact of the policy on R&D and innovation (as measured by patenting). Using total 
assets in the pre-policy period of 2007 we show that there was no evidence of discontinuities 
around the threshold prior to the policy, which is unsurprising as the new threshold was only 
relevant for the R&D tax incentive scheme and not for other programs targeting SMEs. 
The policy caused an economically and statistically significant increase in R&D and pa-
tenting, and there is no evidence that the new patenting was of significantly lower value. Hence 
R&D tax policies do seem effective in increasing innovation, they are not simply devices for 
relabeling existing spending. The elasticity of R&D with respect to changes in its (tax adjusted) 
user cost is around 2.6. We argue that this is higher than existing estimates because we focus on 
firms that are smaller than those conventionally used in the extant literature and are more likely 
to be subject to financial constraints. The policy seems to be cost effective, in aggregate stimulat-
ing £1.7 of R&D for every £1 of taxpayer subsidy. Over the 2006-2011 period we calculate that 
                                                     
70 ߶௜௝ ൌ 1 if firm ݅ operates in the same industry as firm ݆ and ߶௜௝ ൌ 0 otherwise. To calculate ߶௜௝, we use firms’ 
primary industry codes at 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). These data are available from FAME.     
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the tax scheme meant aggregate R&D was 16% higher than it would otherwise have been, halt-
ing the secular decline of the UK’s share of business R&D in GDP. 
There are many caveats when moving from these results to policy. Although the results 
are optimistic about the efficacy of tax incentives, the large effects come from smaller firms and 
should not be generalized across the entire size distribution – this does imply that targeting R&D 
policy on financially constrained SMEs is worthwhile (although a first best policy would be to 
deal directly with credit market imperfections).  
We have partially examined general equilibrium effects by demonstrating that the R&D 
tax policy stimulated patenting activity not only for the firms directly affected, but also created 
spillovers for other firms who were indirectly affected. However, there may be other equilibrium 
effects that reduce innovation. For example, subsidies are captured in the form of higher wages 
rather than a higher volume of R&D, especially in the short-run. We believe that this is less 
likely to be a first order problem when there is large international mobility of inventors, as is the 
case in the UK (e.g. e.g. Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva, 2015, and within the US see Moretti 
and Wilson, 2015). Finally, it is unclear if tax breaks are the optimal form of support for innova-
tion. Direct support of basic R&D in the science base and increasing the supply of future talent 
into the innovation sector (e.g. Bell et al., 2015) are policies that may have more powerful effects 
on innovation and growth in the long term. 
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Table 1. Baseline sample descriptive statistics 
Sample Firms with total assets in 2007 
between €61m and €86m 
Firms with total assets in 2007 
between €86m and €111m 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 06-08 avg.
09-11 
avg. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
06-08 
avg.
09-11 
avg. 
    
Total no. firms in the subsample 3,561 2,327 
Mean  qual. R&D exp. (£ ’000) 50.0 70.9 52.6 68.9 71.8 75.3 57.8 72.0 87.1 110.6 85.7 100.5 91.9 88.4 94.5 93.6 
Mean patents 0.065 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.066 0.053 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.058 0.042 
Mean UK patents 0.078 0.084 0.078 0.072 0.067 0.070 0.080 0.070 0.062 0.081 0.074 0.056 0.045 0.050 0.072 0.050 
Mean EPO patents 0.028 0.032 0.036 0.031 0.028 0.024 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.020 0.025 0.023 0.030 0.023 
Note: The baseline sample includes 5,888 firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m. Total assets are from FAME and are converted to € from £ using HMRC 
rules. Qualifying R&D expenditure comes from CT600 panel dataset and are converted to 2007 prices. Patent counts come from PATSTAT. 
Table 2. R&D regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable R&D expenditure (£ ’000) 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before After Difference 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-08 average 
2009-11 
average After - Before 
Below asset threshold dum-
my (in 2007) 
61.5 96.1 32.0 120.7** 157.8*** 137.2** 63.2 138.5** 75.3** 
(58.5) (72.1) (40.4) (59.0) (58.6) (53.7) (53.4) (55.3) (36.3) 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Mean R&D between 2006 and 2008 was £72,312 and between 
2009 and 2011 was £80,545. 2007 real prices. 
38 
 
 
Table 3. Pre-treatment covariate balance tests and placebo tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Ln(Sales) Ln(Fixed assets) Ln(Employment) R&D exp. (£ ’000) 
Year 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2009-11 average 
            
            
Below asset threshold dummy 
(in 2007) 
-0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.15 -16.5 48.6 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (41.7) (77.1) 
SME threshold (€) 86m 86m 86m 86m 86m 86m 71m 101m 
Sample bandwidth 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 46-86m 86-126m 
Firms 3,650 3,848 4,771 5,083 2,972 3,089 7,095 3,354 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Columns 1-6 report pre-treatment covariate tests for sales, 
employment, and capital. Columns (7) and (8) report placebo tests using placebo asset threshold of €71m and €101m. 
 
Table 4: Reduced-form patent regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable All patent count 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before After Difference 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-08 average 
2009-11 
average After - Before 
Below asset threshold dum-
my (in 2007) 
0.026 0.043 0.045 0.081*** 0.066** 0.074** 0.038 0.073*** 0.035* 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design.  The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firm’s total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Mean patent count between 2006 and 2008 was 0.060 and be-
tween 2009 and 2011 was 0.052. 
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Table 5: The effects of R&D tax policy on patent quality 
 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Quality measures are baseline patent count (column 1), EPO 
patent count (column 2), UK patent count (column 3), patent by family count (i.e. patent by country count) (column 4), chemistry/pharmaceutical patent count (column 5), and 
non-chemistry/pharmaceutical patent count (column 6), EPO patent by citation count (column 7), and UK patent by citation count (column 8). 
 
Table 6. Effects of R&D on patents (IV regressions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  (2009-11 average) All patent count EPO patent count UK patent count 
Specification OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
R&D expenditure (£ million), 
2009-11 average 
0.168** 0.530** 0.094** 0.268* 0.207** 0.680** 
(0.074) (0.254) (0.04) (0.140) (0.093) (0.327) 
Anderson-Rubin test p-value 0.005 0.024 0.004 
Hausman test p-value 0.15 0.32 0.12 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Instrumental variable is the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m. Baseline sample includes firms 
with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the running variable (total assets in 
2007) separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Adjusted first-stage F-statistic is 6.3. P-values of Anderson-Rubin weak-
instrument-robust inference tests indicate that the IV estimates are statistically different from zero even in the possible case of weak IV.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Baseline EPO patents UK patents Family size (i.e. countries)
Chemistry/pharma 
patents 
Non-chem/pharma 
patents 
EPO patent 
citations 
UK patent 
citations 
   
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.073*** 0.037** 0.094*** 0.214** 0.024* 0.050** 0.004** 0.023 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.033) (0.085) (0.014) (0.022) (0.002) (0.021) 
Dependent variable 
mean over 2006-08 0.060 0.031 0.077 0.222 0.015 0.045 0.013 0.062 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
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Table 7. Heterogeneous effects of R&D Tax policy by firm age (as proxies for financial constraints) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable R&D expenditure (£ ’000) 
Year After (2009-11 avg.) After - Before After (2009-11 average) After - Before 
Subsample Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms 
 
Young firms 
& profits > 0
Old firms & 
profits > 0 
Young firms 
& profits > 0
Old firms & 
profits > 0 
  
Below asset threshold dummy 
(in 2007) 
92.3** 198.4* 97.9** 56.3 124.5* 107.7 111.0 46.0 
(42.1) (104.2) (42.2) (59.4) (70.0) (120.7) (93.2) (79.6) 
Mean over 2006-08 37.9 107.1 46.2 90.6 
Mean after - before   2.8 46.8    -8.6 29.4 
Firms 2,928 2,955 2,928 2,955 956 1,585 956 1,585 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running variable separate-
ly for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1)-(4): Median firm age in 2007 is 12 years. Ratios of treatment effect to 
baseline mean R&D over 2006-08 for young and old firms are 2.6 and 0.5 respectively which are statistically different at the 10% level. The implied tax-price elasticities are 
4.7 among young firms and 1.6 among old firms and these are also statistically different at 10% level. Columns (5)-(8): “Profits > 0” indicates that a firm had corporate tax 
liabilities at some point between 2005 and 2007. Ratios of treatment effect to baseline mean R&D over 2006-08 for young and old firms are 2.8 and 0.5 respectively. Implied 
tax-price elasticities are 4.8 among young firms and 1.6 among old firms.  
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Table 8. Effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme on other measures of firms performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A. Dependent variable:  Ln(sales) 
 Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before               After          Difference 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-08 2009-11 After - Before 
   
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.187 0.029 -0.102 0.212 0.404** 0.297 -0.012 0.231 0.218* 
(0.170) (0.167) (0.162) (0.180) (0.187) (0.192) (0.154) (0.177) (0.114) 
Firms 3,292 3,439 3,393 3,311 3,294 3,255 3,398 3,398 3,398 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Ln(capital) 
   
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.017 -0.035 -0.0096 -0.020 -0.008 0.010 -0.077 -0.038 0.039 
(0.120) (0.109) (0.113) (0.122) (0.131) (0.135) (0.106) (0.124) (0.077) 
Firms 3,721 3,958 3,791 3,608 3,451 3,316 3,651 3,651 3,651 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Ln(employment) 
   
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.0118 0.102 0.0838 0.107 0.263* 0.292* 0.055 0.188 0.134 
(0.126) (0.123) (0.131) (0.140) (0.147) (0.153) (0.125) (0.141) (0.086) 
Firms 2,468 2,550 2,431 2,445 2,551 2,469 2,387 2,387 2,387 
Panel D. Dependent variable:  Total factor productivity 
   
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.328 -0.106 -0.199 -0.0321 0.123 0.0239 -0.120 0.127 0.247** 
(0.255) (0.237) (0.235) (0.245) (0.258) (0.264) (0.234) (0.245) (0.118) 
Firms 2,025 2,091 2,017 1,952 1,913 1,881 1,989 1,989 1,989 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) results (OLS). The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a thresh-
old of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running 
variable separately for each side of the threshold and two digit industry dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm in brackets. Panel A uses sales from 
CT600. Panel B uses fixed assets (from FAME). Panel C uses employment (from FAME). Total factor productivity in Panel D is calculated as 
lnሺݏ݈ܽ݁ݏሻ െ	ሺ1െ∝௟ሻlnሺܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽሻ െ	∝௟ lnሺ݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐሻ	, where ∝௟ is the share of labor costs in total revenue at the two-digit industry level across all firms in the FAME 
dataset averaged across the 2006-2011 period. Columns (7) – (9) condition on the “balanced” sample where we observe the outcome variable in at least one year of the pre-
policy sample and one year of the post-policy sample (i.e. it is a sub-sample of the observations in columns (1) – (6)). 
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Table 9: Estimating R&D technology spillovers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Specification First stage Reduced form IV 
Dependent variable: 
(2009-2011 average) 
࢙࢖࢏࢒࢒ 
࢚ࢋࢉࢎࡾࡰ  
R&D exp. 
(£ ’000) 
All patent 
count 
R&D exp. 
(£ ’000) 
All patent 
count All patent count 
ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ 
(sum tech. distance x dummy) 
35.9*** 133.9 0.344** 
(11.0) (204.7) (0.146) 
Below asset threshold dummy (in 2007) 
-0.5 180.7** 0.045 182.4** 0.050 
(4.1) (83.8) (0.052) (80.1) (0.063) 
ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ 
(sum tech. distance x £ million) 
3.7 0.010** 0.009* 
(5.6) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D expenditure (£ million), 2009-11 average 
0.273 
(0.368) 
Mean over 2006-08 22.7 65.3 0.059 65.3 0.059 0.059 
Firms 10,449 10,449 10,449 10,440 10,449 10,449 
Note: Sample of firms with total assets in 2007 between €46m and €126m. *** Significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors clustered by firm in brackets. 
Controls include third order polynomials of total assets in 2007, separately for each side of the asset threshold of €86m, and ܩ൫ݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൌ 	∑ ߱௜௝݃ሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ௝ஷ௜  as described in 
sub-section 5.8; ݃ሺݖ௝,ଶ଴଴଻ሻ are third order polynomials of technology-connected firms’ total assets in 2007, also separately for each side of the asset threshold. In column (6), 
the instrument variable for ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄ܴ݁ܿܦ is ݏ݌݈݈݅ݐ݄݁ܿܵܯܧ and instrument variable for R&D expenditure is below-asset-threshold dummy.      
 
